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Symmetric Pass-Through of Tariffs and Exchange Rates
Under Imperfect Competition: An Empirical Test
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the effect of tariffs and exchange rates on U.S.
pricesof Japanese cars, trucks and motorcycles. In particular, we test
whether the long run pass—through of tariffs and exchange rates are identical
thesymmetry hypothesis. We find that this hypothesis is easily acceptedin
our sample. We also find that the pass-through relationvaries across
products, ranging from about 0.6 for trucks to unity for motorcycles.These
coefficients have very different implications for trade policy. We explain
the results based on demand, cost and institutional conditions in each
industry. We also find weak evidence that the pass-throughof exchange rates
hasfallen in more recent years.
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The appreciation of the dollar during 1979—85 has led to renewed interest
in the "passthrough1' relationship between exchange rates and traded goods
prices. A number of recent studies, including Woo (1984), Mann (1986),
Dornbusch (1987), Giovannini (1987), and Krugman and Baldwin (1987), have
analyzed the extent to which U.S. import prices failed to fall by as much as
the value of foreign currencies. These authors generally appeal to some model
of imperfect competition, whereby foreign producers increased their profit
margins during the 1979-85 period. In contrast, after 1985 import prices have
not risen by as much as the dollar depreciation, and foreign profit margins
are being squeezed.
Concurrent with these studies, a body of literature has grown on the
effects of trade policy under imperfect competition.1 Katrak (1977), De Meza
(1979), Svedberg (1979) and Brander and Spencer (1984) analyze how a foreign
monopolist faced with a tariff will optimally change its producer price.If
the producer price is lowered then the tariff is less than fully passed
through in consumer prices, and the importing country experiences a terms of
trade and welfare gain.In this case there is a Hterms of trade argument for
import protection, but it is due to imperfect competition abroad rather than
the traditional large country model.
In section 2 we demonstrate that a permanent change in exchange rates or
ad valorem tariffs have identical effects on the consumer price of imports,
with a foreign oligopolistic supplier. The purpose of our paper is to test
this hypothesis using data for Japanese car, truck and motorcycle imports. A—2—
test of the symmetry hypothesis is of particular interestbecause there is
abundant evidence that exchange rates are less than fully passedthrough in
some markets.2 If this result also holds fortariffs in our sample, we can
appeal to symmetry to suggest that the result mayhold for trade policy in
other markets. This is a significant step towards establishingthe empirical
validity of the "terms of trade" argument for tariffs,under imperfect
competition.
Our empirical specification is outlined in section 3 andresults are
presented in section 4. We find that the symmetry hypothesisis easily
accepted for the tariff changes which occurredin truck and heavy cycle
imports. For trucks the pass-through coefficientwhich applies to either a
permanent change in exchange rates or thetariff is estimated as 0.582
(standard error of 0,062). In contrast, for heavy cycles weobtain a
pass—through of unity or even higher. For carsthe tariff did not change over
the sample period, and the pass-through of exchange ratesis 0.725. Thus,
while we are able to accept the symmetry hypothesis, we observe awide range
of pass—through coefficients in our sample (this result isalso found by
Krugman, 1987 using German data). These coefficientshave very different
implications for trade policy, since a tariff coefficientwhich is less than
(equal to) unity implies a nationally optimal tariff whichis positive (zero).
Some reasons for this variation in our results across industries areoffered
in section 4. We also examine whether the pass—through of exchangerates has
fallen in more recent years, as suggested by Mann (1986) and Baldwin(1987),
and find weak evidence to support this hypothesis. Conclusions are givenin
section 5.-3-
2. Pricing Under Imperfect Competition
We consider a variant of the model used by Brander and Spencer (1984).
The home currency price of the imported and domestic varieties of a good are
denoted by p and q, respectively.3 Import demand is x(p,q,I) where I denotes
income. The foreign firm maximizes expected profits in its own currency,
treating q as exogenous.4 We shall assume that its pricing decision must be
made before the exchange rate is known with certainty. As discussed by
McKinnon (1979, chap. 4), Baron (1976) and Giovannini (1987), the foreign firm
then faces a decision as to which currency to use in announcing its price. We
shall not analyse this problem, but rely on the fact that 82 percent of
Japanese auto sales to the U.S. are invoiced in dollars (Hamada and Horiuchi,
1987, Table 7.6). Since our empirical work deals with this market, we shall
simply assume that the foreign firm sets its price in the domestic currency,
i.e., chooses p.
Denote the foreign spot price of the domestic currency by s, which is
random. Costs in the foreign currency are given by C(x,w*), where w denotes
an aggregate of foreign factor prices, and is treated as a scalar. Assuming
that costs are homogeneous of degree one in factor prices, they can be written
as C(x,w*) =(x)w*,where •'> o (< 0)indicates rising (falling) marginal
costs. The foreign firm's profit maximization problem can then be stated as,
maxE{spx(p,q,I) —(x)w*}, (1)
where E denotes expected value. We assume that variables other than the
exchange rate are nonrandom.5 Letting e =E(s)denote the expected exchange
rate, (1) can be rewritten as,-4-
max{epx(p,q,I) — (1')
This certainty—equivalent structure to the firm's problem would not ariseif
the import prices were set in the foreign currency; see Baron (1976)and
Giovannini (1987).
The first order condition for (1') is,
=p[1-(l/n)]r(p,q,I), (2)
where r= _XpP/xdenotes the (positive) elasticity of demand and r(p,q,I)
denotes marginal revenue. Assuming that ["xp(w*/e) —rp]0,we can invert
(2) to obtain the pricing equation,
p =r(w,q,I), (3)
where w =w*/edenotes foreign factor prices in the domestic currency.
Equation (3) shall be estimated in the following sections.Our purpose
here is to show how the elasticities of rdependon the underlying demand and
cost functions. A general property of risthat it is homogeneous of degree
one in its arguments. That is, increasing w, q andI by the same proportion
would increase the optimal import price by that proportion. To see this,note
that the demand function x(p,q,I) must be homogeneous of degree zeroin its
arguments. It follows that the first derivative x(p,q,I)is homogeneous of
degree negative one. Then it is readily seen thatif (p,w,q,I) satisfies the
first order condition (2), then x(p,w,q,I) also satisifies this equation,for
any x >0.Thus, ,ishomogeneous of degree one and this property can be
empirically tested.—5—
2.1 Changes in the Exchange Rate, Domestic Price, and Income
Totally differentiating (2), we obtain
(dpldw)(wlp) =1/[('x/)+(rpp/r)]. (4)
Recalling that w =w*/e,this elasticity gives the change in the import price
due to a change in the expected exchange rate or foreign factor prices. The
second order condition for profit maximization implies that (4) is positive.6
Its magnitude, however, depends on the underlying form of demand and costs.
The term (rpp/r) is the elasticity of marginal revenue with respect to
price, which can be written from (2) as,
(rpp/r) =1+(pIr)(npIii2)
1 as 0. (5)
Along a linear demand curve flp >0so that (rpp/r) >1,but the case <0is
certainly possible. The term ("x/) is the elasticity of marginal cost with
respect to output, and its sign is the same as that of ".




(6a) is the "normal case where a change in the expected exchange rate (or
foreign factor prices) is less than fully passed through in import price. It
occurs, for example, when demand is close to linear and marginal costs are—6-
increasing.7 However, the unusual case where a change in the expected
exchange rate is more than fully passed through cannot be ruled out
theoretically. It occurs, for instance, when the elasticity of demand is
constant or decreasing in price, and marginal costs are declining.
Turning to the effect of a change in income, from (2) we calculate
(dp/dI)(I/p) =[("xI')m
—(r1IIr)]I [('xI') +(rpp/r)], (7)
where m =x11/xis the income elasticity of demand for the import. The
denominator in (7) is the same as in (4), which is positive. To sign the
numerator, consider the case where m is positive and constant for all prices.
This implies that demand is of the general form mx =lnf(p,q)+mlnl,or
x(p,q,I) =f(p,q)Im.Calculating the elasticity of demand we obtain
=-fop/fwhich is independent of income. Thus, marginal revenue does not
depend on income and r1 =0.The sign of (7) then depends on whether marginal
costs are increasing or decreasing:
m >0constant, >0=>(dp/dI)(I/p)>0, (8a)
m >0constant, f" <0=>(dp/dI)(I/p)<0. (8b)
Lastly, we consider the elasticity of p with respect to the price of the
domestic variety q. Sincein (3) is homogeneous of degree one its





using (4), (5) and (7). The magnitude of (9) can be inferred from our earlier
results. For example, if (8a) holds then the first equality in (9)
immediately implies that (dp/dq)(q/p) <1,so an increase in the domestic
price is less than fully matched in the import price. If (6a) and (8a) both
hold and>in,then the second equality in (9) implies that (dp/dq)(q/p) >0.
By also examining the converse case, we obtain the following results:
(6a), (8a) and in => 0<(dp!dq)(q!p)<1, (lOa)
(6b), (8b) and in =>(dp/dq)(q/p)<0. (lOb)
In (lOa) a rise in the domestic price is less than fully matched by an
increase in the import price. In contrast, under (lob) the import price would
fall. This occurs, for example, when prices are a constant markup over
marginal costs (r =0)and the latter are declining as imports rise (c <0
with r in).
Notethat in the analysis above we have treated the domestic price q as a
parameter. It would not difficult to treat q as endogenous by adding a
condition analogous to (2) for the domestic price. Then the effects of
changing the expected exchange rate or factor prices would be obtained by
comparative statistics on the two equation system. We do not report these
results here, since our empirical specification will focus directly on the
pricing equation (3), the properties of which we have characterized above.-8-
2.2 Changes in the Ad Valorem Tariff
Suppose that an ad valorem tariff of r is applied to imports. Let p
denote the consumer price of imports, so the foreign firm receives p/(1+r).
With e still denoting the expected exchange rate, the foreign profit





The structure of (2') makes it clear that a change in the tariff (1+T)
has the same effect on the consumer price p as a change in (w*/e). This point
is also seen by writing the first order condition for (2') as
=r(p,q,I),and inverting to obtain
p =,r[w(1+t),q,I], (3')
where w =w*/eas before. Any changes in the tariff or expected exchange rate
which have the same effect on (1+r)/e will have identical pass—through on the
consumer price of imports: this is the symmetry hypothesis.
Because of symmetry, the elasticity of the consumer import price with
respect to (1+T) is given by (4) and (6). From (6a), if the elasticity of
demand is increasing in price (as with linear demand) and marginal costs are
rising, then the tariff is less than fully passed through in the import price.
This means that p/(1+T), which is the foreign producer price, is reduced.
This rise in the terms of trade corresponds to an increase in welfare for the—9 -
domesticcountry (Katrak, 1977; Svedberg, 1979; Brander and Spencer, 1984).
Thus, under conditions (6a) there is a "terms of trade" argument for import
protection, due to oligopolistic pricing abroad.
If (6b) holds then nationally optimal intervention instead takes the form
of an import subsidy (DeMeza, 1979; Brander and Spencer, 1984). The negative
value of Tismore than fully passed through in the import price, so p/(1+T)
is reduced. This again corresponds to a rise in the terms of trade and
increase in welfare for the importing country.
Note that the welfare results stated above apply when q is held constant
and profits of the domestic firm are not affected by the tariff. If instead q
is endogenous and profits change, then the welfare analysis is more complex.
First, we must consider the impact of the tariff on profits of domestic firms,
which depends on the assumed market structure, i.e., on the conjectural
variations and possibility of entry (Brander and Spencer, 1981; Eaton and
Grossman, 1986; Horstmann and Markusen, 1986). Second, we should recognize
that a tariff which increases domestic output can reduce the divergence
between marginal cost and marginal utility of the domestic variety (Eaton and
Grossman, 1986). Third, we could consider the effect of the tariff on the
number of varieties produced by domestic and foreign firms (Feenstra and Judd,
1982; Feenstra, 1988b). These various effects could be combined in a
computable model, as done by Dixit (1988) for the U.S. auto industry. Our
goal in this paper is more limited, however, and we shall just evaluate the
"terms of trade' effect by estimating the pass-through of tariffs and the
exchange rate, using the pricing equation (3').- 10-
3.Regression Specification and Data
We shall use a log—linear specification for (3'):
lflpt =ct+czln(w/et)
+lfl(1+tt)+ylnq+tSlflIt+ (11)
where ct =C0 + c1t
+c2t2
is a time trend and is a random error. To
estimate (11) we must specify how the expected exchange rate is determined.
We shall suppose that the expected rate in each quarter is a log—linear
function of the current and past quarterly-average spot rates:
k
lne =z e.lns.. (12)
i=0
1 1
Thecoefficients ei in (12) would depend on the time-series properties of
exchange rates. For example, if the spot rates follow a random walk then
rational expectations would be formed with e= 1and 0j =0for I1.Other
cases are considered by Frankel and Froot (1987). Including the current
quarterly—average exchange rate s in (12) is meant to reflect information
received by firms within a quarter which is then immediately reflected in
prices. If our units of time were smaller, such as monthly or weekly, then
omitting the current spot rate would be appropriate.8






where .= e.zand z o. =1is assumed. The errors in (13) can arise from
1 1 i=0
1
inaccurate measurement of prices (see below) or price presetting for periods
exceeding one quarter (see Giovannini, 1987). When estimating (13) we shall
check for autocorrelation in ci. Quarterly dummies are also used when
needed.
Our primary reason for estimating (13) is to test for symmetric
pass-through of tariffs and a permanent change in exchange rates. This




which is a linear constraint on the coefficients in (13). We also wish to
test that the pricing equation is homogeneous of degree one, which can be
stated as
k
. ++ =1. (14b)
1=0
1
This homogeneity test is a check for the overall specification of the pricing
equation, and is analogous to testing that a conventional demand system is
homogeneous of degree zero in prices and income. It will be of particular
interest to test (14a) and (14b) simultaneously.
Of secondary interest in (13) is the time pattern of the coefficients j,
which indicate the rate at which exchange rate changes are passed though in
import prices. To reduce erratic behavior of the coefficient estimates, we
shall use a second—order polynomial lag on j, so that j =a+ bi + ci2. For





Substituting (15) into (14) shows how symmetry and homogeneity can be tested
when using the polynomial lag.
We shall estimate the pricing equation separately for U.S. imports of
Japanese cars, compact trucks and heavy motorcycles (greater than700 cc).
The sample period lies between 1974:1 and 1987:1, depending on data
availability. Japanese trucks experienced an increase in their tariff from 4
to 25 percent, effective August 21, 1980. Heavy motorcycles had a tariff of
45 percent imposed on April 16, 1983, falling annually to 35, 20, 15 and 10
percent, and ending in October 1987. The ad valorem tariff on Japanese cars
did not change during the sample period, so this regression is estimated to
observe the pass-through of exchange rates without testing symmetry.
The most important features of the data are summarized here. The import
prices are either wholesale (c.i.f.) unit—values inclusive of duty, or Divisia
indexes of several dissaggregate wholesale unit—values. They are obtained
from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1974-1987). In addition to the well known
problems with using unit-values, these data series suffer from not correcting
for quality change. The most pronounced quality change occurred in Japanese
cars (Feenstra 1984, 1988a), which were subject to a uvoluntary export
restraint's since April 1981. This restraint changes the nature of the optimal
pricing decision for importing firms, so (3') no longer applies. For this
reason we omit the period of the trade restraint when estimating the car
regression. Other upgrading which may have occurred in any of the products
can be reflected in the time trend c and random error ct in (13).— 13—
Amongthe independent variables, the spot exchange rate (measured as a
quarterly average) shows great fluctuation, ranging between 300 and 150
yen/dollar during the sample period. The factor price aggregates w are
measured as the Japanese domestic wholesale prices for each product, available
from the Bank of Japan (1974—1986). They are very stable over time. For cars
and trucks a quarterly price deflator for U.S. absorption (qt), and total U.S.
expenditure on each product ('t) are available from the U.S. Dept. of
Commerce (1974-1987). For cars we also included the unit—value of Geran
imports (from U.S. Bureau of the Census) as another competing price. Since
the variables q and I are endogenous, all the car, truck and cycle
regressions were estimated with instrumental variables.10
For heavy cycle imports, we had two sources of unit—value data. The
first was interview data reported by the U.S. International Trade Commission
(1983, Table 8, and 1983-1984). The advantage of this data is that it gives
the unit-value of imports for consumption, inclusive of duty, for the major
Japanese importers (Honda, Suzuki and Yamaha). However, the disadvantage is
that the data ends in 1984:4, and it includes German heavy cycles (imported by
BMW) within the reported unit—value.11 A second source was unpublished data
from the U.S. Dept. of Commerce giving the unit—value of import shipments,
distinguishing Japanese and German heavy cycles up to 1987:1.12 The
disadvantage of this data is that import shipments include sales to
inventories, which are very erratic in quantity and to a lesser extent in
unit—value. These data had to be adjusted to include the tariff.13 We shall
use both sources of import price data when estimating the heavy cycle
regression. Finally, data on the price of U.S. heavy cycles was not
available, so the U.S. price of steel was used as a proxy.- 14 -
4.Estimation Results
To determine the appropriate lag length for the exchange rate, we first
estimated (13) with 2, 3, 4 and 5 unconstrained lags. The sum of the
estimated coefficients jfromthis exercise are reported in Table 1. These
estimates measure the total pass—through of the exchange rate on import
prices. The coefficients for cars are significantly less than unity, while in
contrast,the coefficients for heavy cycles are close toone. For trucks and
cyclesthepass-through estimates reach a maximum with k =4quarterly lags.
While there is no generally accepted technique for choosing the length for a
polynomial lag (see Judge etal., 1980, Chap. 5), our approach in this paper
is to make a pass—through of less than unity "prove itself" by including too
many lags rather than too few. We experimented with a lag length of 3 and 4
quarters, but since the results were quite similar, we report below only the
results for a second-order polynomial lag with k =4.Note that using the
polynomial lag leads to coefficents which are not significantly different
from the unconstrained estimates.
In Table 2 we report the estimates of (13) without imposing the symmetry
or homogeneity constraints (14). Quarterly dummies were used in the
motorcycle regressions, but were not needed for cars or trucks since their
t—statistics in those cases were less than unity. The time trend in (13) was
used in each of the regressions, but its coefficients and those of the
quarterly dummies are not reported.14 For heavy cycles the "pooled"
regression in the last column simply stacks the "consumption" and "shipments"
regressions, which differ in their measurement of the import price (see
section 3).— 15—
Consideringthe results in Table 2, the pass-through coefficients range
from 0.627 for trucks to about unity for cycles. These results differ
slightly from Table 1 since the polynomial lag was not used there. It can be
seen that the pass—through is quite rapid since the j estimates are nearly
zero for the third lag, and also for the second lag except in cars. The
coefficents on the final lag move away from zero in some cases, especially for
cycles (shipments). When a fifth lag is added to the cycle regressions
(without using the polynomial constraint) then the estimates of j for the
fourth lag are still positive and high, but are zero for the fifth lag. Thus,
there is some curious annual effect in the cycle data, whereby the import
price depends on the exchange rate one year ago.
Turning to other coefficients in Table 2, the elasticity of the import
price with reprect to the tariff is 0.570 for trucks and between 0.949 and
1.388 for cycles. These estimates are within two standard errors of the
pass—through coefficients for the exchange rate, which suggests that the
symmetry hypothesis will be accepted. The coefficients of the U.S. price
differ substantially in magnitude over the products, but are insignificant.
The coefficients of the German price, and income, are all highly
insignificant. Note that the Dut'bin-Watson statistics are surprisingly good.
We also ran the regressions while separating w from the exchange rate
terms. The coefficents we obtain on w vary substantially in magnitude
(ranging from —1 for cars to 12 for cycles), but in most cases are
insignificantly different from those in Table 2.If we omit w entirely, the
estimated pass-through of exchange rates are similar to those in Table 2.— 16 -
4.1Test of Symmetry and Homogeneity
In Table 3 we report estimates of (13) when the symmetry and homogeneity
constraints (14) are imposed. For cars and trucks the exchange rate
pass—through changes slightly, while the coefficients of U.S. and German
pricesimprove considerably. In contrast, for heavy cycles the coefficients
of U.S. and German prices are erratic and insignificant. The pass-through of
exchangerates and the tariff is between 0.971 and 1.272.
In Table 4 we report the calculated F—statistics testing whether the
symmetry and homogeneity constraints (14) can be accepted. Note that because
the regressions are estimated with instrumental variables, the F—statistics
need not be positive, as observed for the homogeneity constraint in cars.15
They are asymptotically distributed as x2(R)/R when the constraints hold,
where R is the number of restrictions. Looking down Table 4, we see that the
symmetry and homogeneity constraints are easily accepted for the individual
products. In the second-last test, we report the F—statistic testing whether
the cycle (consumption) and cycle (shipments) data can be pooled. We accept
this hypothesis and, conditional on it, also accept symmetry and homogeneity
in the pooled cycle regression.
Acceptance of the homogeneity constraint supports the overall
specification of our regressions. Acceptance of the symmetry constraint is
consistent with the model presented in section 2, and supports our prior
beliefs. Applying this results to other markets, it means that the response
of import prices to exchange rates can be used to predict the effect of
changes in tariffs. This result could be quite useful for the analysis of
trade policy. However, our results also show that the pass—through differs— 17—
substantiallyacross industries, and in particular, is not always less than
unity.
To explain these results, consider first the tariff coefficient for
trucks. In Feenstra (1988b) the price and characteristics of trucks sold by
American and Japanese producers are studied in detail. Prior to the tariff
increase, nearly all compact trucks were produced by Japanese firms, some of
which were marketed through American automobile companies. After the tariff
was raised to 25 percent in August 1980, U.S. producers quickly introduced
their own compact truck models, but with very similar characteristics to
existing Japanese models. In this environment we would expect price competition
to be intense, and Japanese firms would be very reluctant to pass through the
full amount of the tariff. This is consistent with our estimated tariff
coefficient of 0.582.
In contrast, for heavy cycles we estimate tariff coefficients of unity or
even higher. We offer two explanations for this result. First, the tariff
increase in April 1983 was applied to both imports from Japan and heavy cycles
produced in the U.S. by Honda and Kawasaki. The latter producers operate plants
in foreign trade zones (FTZ) in the mid-west. When a good is sold from a FTZ
into the U.S., the producer can normally pay the U.S. tariff on either the final
product or imported parts, whichever is less. However, for the case of heavy
cycles, Honda and Kawasaki had to pay the final tariff on their U.S. sales from
the FTZ (see U.S. International Trade Commission, 1987, p. A—6 and Appendix E).
With this rise in U.S. prices (except for Harley—Davidson), it is not too
surprising that the Japanese exporters (Honda, Suzuki and Yamaha) would
pass—through much of the tariff.- 18-
Asecond important feature of this industry is the dramatic drop in
production following the tariff: total production in Japan was cut in half from
1982 to 1984, 1985 or 1986 (U.S. International Trade Commission, 1987, Table
22). The reason is that U.S. exports accounted for about 60% of Japanese
production prior to the tariff, but these exports dropped to about 15% of their
former quantity after the tariff. Note that U.S. consumption of Japanese heavy
cycles did not drop by this much, because many U.S. sales were made from
previously accumulated inventories.
In order to cover fixed costs with this drop in production, it is quite
possible that Japanese firms would have to raise their prices, which would cause
consumer prices to increase by more than the tariff. From (4), this is a profit
maximizing response when
=0,implying that producer prices are a constant
markup over marginal costs, and <0so that marginal costs rise with the fall
in output. This scenario is consistent with the tariff coefficient exceeding
unity in our cycles (shipments) regression. However, we cannot make a strong
case that the tariff was more than fully passed through, since the estimated
coefficient in any of the cycle regressions is insignificantly different from
one.
4.2 Pass-Through in Various Time Periods
The large swings in the value of the dollar during the 1980's has led to the
hypothesis that the pass-through of exchange rates to U.S. import prices may have
fallen. For example, if foreign firms believe that the recent depreciation of
the dollar is temporary, they could resist raising their dollar prices too much,
hoping to retain market share. Several models in which this phenomenon can occur— 19—
areanalysed by Krugman (1987), and empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis
for aggregate U.S. import prices is presented in Mann (1986) and Baldwin (1987).
Without making any strong prior case that this phenomenon might apply to our
sample of industries, we can certainly check whether the pass-through has fallen.
In Table 5 we report the total pass—through of exchange rates (i.e., sum of
.jcoefficients) for trucks and heavy cycles during various sub—periods. We did
not impose symmetry or homogeneity in these regressions, so the pass-through
coefficientscan be comparedwith Table 2.We also show in Table 5the
F—statisticsand critical values for testing whether the observations used there
are drawn from the same population as Table 2 (i.e., whether the pass—through
coefficients in the two tables are insignificantly different).16
For trucks we obtain a pass—through of 0.576 for the 1977—84 period, before
the dollar began to depreciate. This is slightly lower, but insignificantly
different, than the coefficent of 0.627 for the entire 1977-87 period. However,
ifwe instead check for a structural break in the truck regression between
1977—80 and 1981-87, when the dollar began its appreciation, we obtain
coefficentsof 0.679 and 0.434, respectively.Thus, there is weak evidence that
thepass-through relationship fell, though the change is not significant by the
F—test. For cycles (shipments) we estimate a pass-through which is
insignificantly higher during 1978—84, and lower during 1981—87, than for the
entire 1978—87 period. In cycles (pooled) we obtain a coefficient of 1.051 over
1978—84, which compares with 0.886 over 1978—87, again giving weak evidence that
the pass-through of exchange rates has fallen.- 20-
5. Conclusions
In this paper we have used data on U.S. imports of Japanese cars, trucks
and motorcycles to estimate the pass-through of exchange rates and tariffs.
For trucks we have found a pass—through of about 0.6. This means that the
increase in the tariff from 4 to 25 percent in August 1980 raised consumer
prices by an estimated 13 percent, and lowered Japanese producer prices by
about 8 percent. In contrast, for heavy cycles we found a pass-through of
about unity, so the tariff increase in April 1983 and subsequent decreases had
little effect on Japanese producer prices. These results have very different
implications for trade policy. In trucks, the drop in the producer price
corresponds to a terms of trade gain. While there are several other factors
which should be considered before evaluating welfare (see section 2.2), this is
a first step toward establishing a gain for the U.S. For heavy cycles, the
constant producer prices means that the tariff led to a conventional deadweight
1 oss.
However, our purpose in this paper has not been to judge the efficacy of
trade policy in specific industries. Instead, we have evaluated more generally
a model of imperfect competition and trade, in which foreign firms respond to
tariff and exchange rate changes by adjusting their producer prices. This model
led to the estimating equation (3'), which performed quite well on the industry
data. In particular, we were able to accept the hypothesis of symmetric
pass-through of tariffs and exchange rates. This means that the response of
import prices to exchange rates can be used to predict the effect of changes in
tariffs. But the variation in our results across industries means that
empirical evidence is needed in each case, and that we cannot make general
statements about the extent of pass-through.- 21—
Footnotes
1. In contrast to this paper, much of the literature deals with a "profit
shifting" motive for import protection. See Brander and Spencer (1981),
Dixit (1984) and Eaton and Grossman (1986). Horstmann and Markusen
(1986) argue that the "profit shifting" motive disappears when entry is
free, but a "terms of trade" motive persists, as analyzed here.
2. See Dunn (1970), Clark, Logue and Sweeney (1974), Isard (1977), Kravis
and Lipsey (1977), Richardson (1978), Schembri and Robicheau (1986) and
the papers mentioned above.
3. For expositional convenience, we consider only a single variety of each
imported and domestic good. The case of many varieties of each is
examined in Feenstra (1986), and the results are basically identical to
those reported below.
4. Thus, we are assuming the foreign and domestic firms act as Betrand
competitors, whereas Brander and Spencer (1984) consider Cournot
competition. Our results are very similar, which demonstrates that they
do not depend on the market structure assumed. In contrast, see Eaton
and Grossman (1986) who analyze how the "profit shifting" motive for
import protection depends on the market structure.
5.More general sources of uncertainty are examined in Giovannini (1987).
6.To see this, differentiate (1') with respect to p obtaining H(p)x/e =0,
where H(p) =r(p,q,I)—4'(x)was in (2). The second order condition is
then H'(p)xp/eH(p)xpp/e < 0. Since Xp < 0 and H(p) =0from (2), the
second order condition reduces to H'(p) > 0, which can be rewritten as
(4) > 0.— 22—
7.More generally, we can think of >0as specifying the class of demand
curves which are less convex (more linear) than constant-elasticity
curves, while <0specifies the class which are more convex.
8. With quarterly data an alternative procedure would have been to include
the spot rate at the end of the last quarter in (12), but this rate
suffers from daily random error. We could also have included the forward
rate in (12), but from the results of Meese and Rogoff (1983) this is not
a better predictor of the exchange rate than the lagged spot rate.
9. The tariff protection was meant to expire in April 1988, but ended early
at the request of Harley—Davidson. The reasons for protection in each of
these industries and background data are provided by Hufbauer, Berliner
and Elliot (1986).
10. The instrumental variables were the U.S. price of steel (from U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics, Producer Price Indexes), wages in car or truck parts
and body manufacturing (from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment
and Earnings), U.S. consumer prices, U.S. private consumption, U.S.
treasury bill rate, German aggregate wages, German consumer prices, and
the current and two lags of the quarterly—average mark/dollar exchange
rate (all from International Monetary Fund, International Financial
Statistics).
11. More disaggregated data were not reported to preserve business
confidentiality. Before 1983 German imports are less than five percent
of Japanese imports (by value or quantity of quarterly shipments), but
during and after 1983 this figure ranges between 20 and 35 percent.— 23—
12.These data were kindly provied by Juanita Kavalauskas of the U.S.
International Trade Commission, who also helped with my many questions.
All data used in this study are available on request.
13. Note that the tariff rates only applied to Japanese imports of heavy
cycles exceeding certain quotas (ranging from 6,000 to 10,000 units
depending on the year). Thus, for shipments exceeding the quota, the
unit-value of imports was multiplied by the appropriate tariff.
14. The time trends did not show any consistent pattern, and were often
insignificant.
15. The SSR shown in Tables 2 and 3, and used in the F—tests, equals
(y—Xb)'(y—Xb) where b is the vector of estimated coefficients using
Instrumental van abi es, but Xis the matrix of actual dependent
variablesbeforethey are regressed on the instruments. This SSR will
not necessarily rise when constraints are imposed on b.
16. The second test we perform for trucks is a conventional Chow test, where
the entire sample period is split between two sub—periods. However, in
other cases we did not have sufficient observations to estimate the
coefficients in both of the sub—periods. In those cases the SSR in the
shorter sub—period is zero, with the number of coefficients exactly equal
to the number of observations. The F—statistic is then calculated as
described in the notes to Table 5.24 -
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products, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2, 511-530.Table 1. Pass-Through of Exchange Rates with Various Lag Lengths
Number of Lags
Sample Period 2 3 4 5
Cars 1974:1—1981:1 0.797 0.712 0.707 0.723
(0.081) (0.082) (0.087) (0.108)
Trucks 1977:1—1987:1 0.521 0.581 0.625 0.592
(0.062) (0.072) (0.082) (0.092)
Cycles 1978:1-1984:4 0.740 0.835 0.907 0.827
(Consumption) (0.444) (0.327) (0.385) (0.426)
Cycles 1978:1-1987:1 0.687 0.780 1.061 0.832
(Shipments) (0.309) (0.362) (0.614) (0.772)
Notes:
Standard errors are in parentheses.Table 2. Unconstrained Regressions, Dependent Variable: Import Price
Cycles Cycles Cycles
Cars Trucks (Consump.) (Shipments) (Pooled)
Period 74.1—81.1 77.1—87.1 78.1-84.4 78.1—87.1 78.1—87.1
N, Ka 29,9 41,9 28,13 37,13 65,13
0.988 0.989 0.907 0.769 0.833
SSRb 0.0159 0.0191 0.0635 0.4720 0.5890
* 0.444* 0.282* 0.288 0.798 Q447*
W,/5 (0.104) (0.057) (0.256) (0.722) (0.212)
* 0.316* 0.139* 0.172* -0.042 0.104
W,/S1 (0.043) (0.030) (0.095) (0.282) (0.093)
* 0.166* 0.061 0.117 -0.335 —0.031
W./S2 (0.080) (0.050) (0.146) (0.568) (0.156)
* -0.0079 0.047 0.124 -0.083 0.042
Wj/S3 (0.053) (0.028) (0.084) (0.234) (0.087)
* _0.205* 0.098 0.192 0.715 0.324
W/S4 (0.102) (0.079) (0.232) (0.823) (0.224)
Exchange Ratec 0.713* 0.627* 0.893* 1.053* 0.886*
(0.100) (0.081) (0.362) (0.564) (0.216)
Tariff 0.570* 0.949* 1.388* 1.129*
(0.138) (0.219) (0.296) (0.155)
U.S. Price 1.002 0.029 0.682 1.143 0.572
(0.934) (0.399) (0.601) (2.171) (0.588)
GermanPrice 0.084 0.056 0.124 0.063
(0.090) (0.107) (0.227) (0.105)
Income -0.026 —0.032 -0.227 —0.215 0.016
(0.117) (0.059) (1.693) (0.648) (0.010)
Durbin-Watson 2.43 1.75 2.73 1.69
Notes:
* Significant at 95%level.Standard errors in parentheses.
a N is the number of observations and K the number of independentvariables.
Coefficientsfor time trends and quarterly dumies are not reported.
b Sum of squared residuals.
c Sum of coefficients for w/st_j, i0,1,...,4. wt is an aggregateof
foreign factor prices, and St_i is the spot exchange rate (yen/$).Table 3. Constrained Regressions, Dependent Variable: Import Price
Cycles Cycles Cycles
Cars Trucks (Consump.) (Shipments) (Pooled)
Period 74.1—81.1 77.1—87.1 78.1—84.4 78.1—87.1 78.1—87.1
N, Ka 29,8 41,7 28,11 37,11 65,11
12 0.989 0.990 0.916 0.785 0.834
SSRb 0.0155 0.0196 0.0642 0.4754 0.6083
* 0.419* 0.285* 0.329* 0.753* 0.488*
W/S (0.096) (0.055) (0.175) (0.321) (0.171)
* 0.318* 0.124* 0.184 0.061 0.154*
Wt/Sti (0.041) (0.026) (0.081) (0.176) (0.087)
* 0.181* 0.040 0.116 -0.189 0.017
W/S2 (0.075) (0.044) (0.136) (0.284) (0.139)
* 0.0081 0.032 0.127 0.0052 0.078
W/S3 (0.047) (0.023) (0.080) (0.139) (0.080)
* _0.202* 0.101 0.215 0.640 0.337
W/S4 (0.098) (0.074) (0.188) (0.422) (0.201)
ExchangeRateC 0.725* 0.582* 0.971* 1.272* 1.075*
(0.095) (0.062) (0.152) (0.276) (0.153)
Tariff 0.582* 0 .971* 1 .272* 1 .075*
(0.062) (0.152) (0.276) (0.153)
U.S. Price 0.259* 0.397* 0.606 —0.161 -0.083
(0.149) (0.071) (0.508) (0.383) (0.180)
German Price 0.115 0.064 -0.025 -0.0092
(0.079) (0.096) (0.171) (0.097)
Income -0 .099 0 .021 -0 .641 -0 .086 0 .018*
(0.071) (0.026) (0.575) (0.330) (0.010)
Durbin-Watson 2.46 1.70 2.75 1.51
Notes: SeeTable 2.Table 4. Tests of Symmetry and Homogeneity
Restrictions 0.90 Critical
Sample (Number) Calculated F Valueb
Cars Homogeneity (1) -0.503 2.71
Trucks Symmetry and 0.419 2.31
Homogeneity(2)
Cycles Symmetry and 0.083 2.31
(Consumption) Homogeneity (2)




Cycles Symmetry and 0.852 2.31
(Pooled) Homogeneity (2)
Notes:
a F =[(SSRrSSRu)/R]/[SSRu/(NuKu)],where SSRu, Nu, Ku are from Table 2,
SSRr is from Table 3, and R is the number of restrictions.
b
C SSRu, N,Ku are from the fifth column of Table 2, while SSRr is from
the sum of the third and fourth columns.Table 5. Pass-Through of Exchange Rates inVariousTime Periods
Pass- SSR Calculated0.90 Critical
Sample Period Througha (N,K)b Fc Valued
Trucks 77.1—84.4 0.576 0.0172 0.282 1.63
(0.187) (32,9)
77.1—80.4 0.679
(0.363) t. 0.0138 112e 1.68
81.1—87.1 0.434 ( (41,17)
(0.091)J
Cycles 78.1-84.4 1.475 0.2713 1.233 1.63
(Shipments) (0.706) (28,13)
81.1—87.1 0.544 0.8989 —0.475 1.54
(1.776) (25,13)
Cycles 78.1-84.4 1.051 0.4227 1.88 1.63
(Pooled) (0.326) (56,13)
Notes:
aStandard errors in parentheses.
b SSR is the sum of squared residuals, N is the number of observations and K
thenumber of independent variables.
C F = [(SSRrSSRu)/R)]/[SSRu/(NuKu)], where SSRu, Nu, Ku are from above
(column3),SSRr, Nr are from Table 2, and R = (NrNu).
d 9(R)/R.
e In this case R = (KuKr).